1 For example, attempts to manipulate the terrorists’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and very specific intelligence suggests a desire to base decisions on near-complete information, not just that which was immediately presented to the group. Moreover, it will examine the argument that Al Qaeda's intelligence and counterintelligence preparations for the operation may be suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the means–ends logic that exemplify most explanations of terrorist rationality. This case study will, therefore, seek to examine the extent to which intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to engage in decision making based on accurate representations of reality rather than false illusions influenced by strong ideological or dogmatic perceptions of the world. This article will critically investigate the proposition that counterintelligence allowed the hijackers to function with confidence during each of these activities, secure in the knowledge that the operation had not been compromised and that they maintained the crucial element of surprise. From communications between the various levels involved in the planning and execution of the operation, to the extensive travel and preparation undertaken by the hijackers, each activity was fraught with danger. The nature of the operation dictated the need for the hijackers to engage in behavior that exposed them to constant risk. Similarly, counterintelligence allowed for the creation of a security umbrella that shielded the operation from exposure throughout all its stages. Aligning decisions to accommodate the conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation served to maximize Al Qaeda's chance of achieving operational success. It will examine the idea that this search for certainty was largely satiated by the organization's extensive use of intelligence. This article will analyze how those involved in the operation, including both the operatives and the leadership that directed and coordinated it, craved high levels of certainty and operational control. The use of intelligence influenced critical elements of the operation, so that various key decisions were directly determined by operational intelligence accumulated over a lengthy period. It will trace Al Qaeda's collection and use of operational intelligence, with particular emphasis on how this intelligence may have influenced a range of operational decisions and how it may provide evidence of Al Qaeda's rational approach to decision making. on 11 September 2001 (hereinafter, “the 9/11 attacks”) as a case study. ![]() This article examines Al Qaeda's use of intelligence and counterintelligence using the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.
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